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Switzerland’s federalism is generally known as being a prime exam-
ple of power-sharing between a federal government and states. It is still 
based on the ideas enshrined in the first constitution of the consolidated 
nation state of 1848. What is less known is how cantonal involvement 
in trade policymaking has changed over the last twenty-five years. As 
elsewhere, due to increased globalization and economic integration – in 
particular, at the European level – the mechanisms to involve the can-
tons have evolved considerably, leading to the creation of new institu-
tions and procedures. While some of them are formalized, others are 
more informal and still in the making. At the same time, the capacity 
of the relatively small sub-federal entities in Switzerland heavily lim-
its their possibilities to influence directly the international relations of 
Switzerland in a systematic and comprehensive way. The federal gov-
ernment still enjoys exclusive competence in this field (like in all its for-
eign policy), yet it must now take into account the particular interests 
of the cantons and consult them in those areas. The final ratification of 
trade agreements does not normally involve the cantons directly but 
only through their representation in Parliament.
Using the especially important agreements between Switzerland 
and the European Union as an example, this chapter demonstrates 
the changing role of the cantons in trade policy that has taken place 
since the early 1990s. Overall, it concludes that increased sub-federal 
involvement has resulted in better acceptance of the negotiation results 
by the cantons (and thereby the population in general), but at the price 
of slower and more complicated communication procedures, which 
affects the flexibility of the federal government. One can probably say 
that in Switzerland the strong engagement of the cantons is primar-
ily a consequence of two factors: strong institutional resources and 
the changing nature of trade policy. Societal mobilization also plays a 
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certain role, but the role of societal actors and political parties in trade 
policy is mostly visible at the federal level because the country is rela-
tively small, and many of the cantons are very small. For parties, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and lobbies it is more efficient to 
work at the federal level, mostly through their offices in the capital.
Situating the Swiss Case
Like many federal states, Switzerland was created as a modern state in 
the nineteenth century from a group of formerly independent territo-
ries. Some of these territories, traditionally known as cantons, had con-
cluded military alliances as early as the thirteenth century;1 others were 
created as a result of wars and territorial agreements between Euro-
pean powers only in the nineteenth century. During the Napoleonic 
occupation in the early nineteenth century they had for a short period 
been joined in a centrally organized state (the so-called Helvetic Repub-
lic) following the French tradition, but they only became a modern uni-
fied federal state in 1848 when (after a short civil war) the Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation was adopted (Federal Constitution 1848). 
This constitution underwent a major reform in 1874 (Federal Constitu-
tion 1874) and was updated (though not fundamentally altered) in 1999 
(Federal Constitution 1999).2 The constitution of 18 April 1999 contains 
the basic rules on the participation of the Swiss cantons in foreign pol-
icy, including trade policy.
Before becoming part of the new federal state, the cantons had, in 
principle, their own foreign policy, including trade policy. In order to 
strengthen the international position of the cantons, the agreements 
between them most often involved questions regarding their political 
and military relations with foreign powers. Important treaties were con-
cluded from the fifteenth century onwards between most or all of the 
cantons and France, the Habsburg Empire, Spain, Milan, Venice, Savoy, 
the Holy See, the Netherlands, and England (see Behr 2014).3 The Swiss 
cantons heavily depended on the income from trade with these powers 
(in particular, exports of livestock and milk products) and from the sale 
of mercenaries, an ancient type of modern human trafficking or trade 
in services. Many treaties were concluded to obtain trade preferences 
and a guaranteed market access. The import of salt was of fundamen-
tal importance and often an important element of these treaties. In the 
eighteenth century, exports of textiles became important. Already in 
1815, the power to conclude military alliances and trade agreements 
was, in principle, transferred to the central organ of the cantons for joint 
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decision making, but the remaining powers of the cantons to conclude 
economic agreements were still relatively important (see Kreis 2012).
The constitution of the newly created federal state of 1848 contained 
the basic model of the cantons’ participation in foreign affairs (includ-
ing trade policy), which is still in force today. In principle, the constitu-
tion introduced the full competence of the federal state to declare war 
and conclude treaties, even in those areas where the cantons were com-
petent domestically. The text mentioned explicitly that the federal com-
petence included the conclusion of customs and trade agreements with 
foreign states (Federal Constitution 1848, article 8). At the same time, 
the cantons kept the right to conclude their own treaties with foreign 
states in the areas of the state economy, cross-border transport, and 
police cooperation, as long as these treaties did not infringe the rights 
of the federal level or other cantons (article 9). In these areas, direct 
negotiations and contacts between the cantons and foreign entities 
were allowed; in all other questions, they had to be arranged through 
the federal government (article 10). The constitution of 1874 contained 
exactly the same provisions.
Although Switzerland is often studied, and sometimes admired, 
as a well-functioning federal state, one should not forget the specific 
geopolitical and geographic conditions under which it has evolved. 
Today the whole country has approximately 8.4 million inhabitants. Of 
these, approximately two million are foreigners who have no voting 
rights at the federal level (and normally neither at the sub-federal level 
nor at the local level). The country is made up of twenty-six cantons. 
These differ enormously in actual size and even more so in the size 
of their population and economic structure. Zurich alone has approxi-
mately 1.4 million inhabitants and thus is home to one-sixth of the total 
population, but there are at least eight cantons with less than 100,000 
inhabitants (and are therefore smaller than an average town in most 
countries). Another five cantons have less than 200,000 inhabitants. 
Among the bigger cantons (after Zurich), it takes only four more can-
tons – Berne (980,000 inhabitants), Vaud (718,000 inhabitants), Aargau 
(613,000 inhabitants), and St Gallen (479,000 inhabitants) – to reach 
more than half of the population of the country. An additional issue 
is the fact that the country has four official languages, and therefore 
the balance between the Germanic part of the country (approximately 
two-thirds of the population) and the Latin part (one-third of the popu-
lation, comprising the French, Italian, and Romansch languages) is an 
important factor in daily politics (see Wouters, Van Kerckhoven, and 
Vidal 2016).4
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Institutional Foundations of Cantonal Participation
The constitution of 1999 did not totally change the principles governing 
the involvement of the cantons in foreign policy matters but essentially 
led to a more detailed description of the rights and duties of the federal 
level and the cantons (for an account under the old constitution see 
Schmitt 1994, 362).5 The foreign relations power is now described at the 
very beginning of the second chapter of the constitution (1999) relating 
to the powers of the federal level (articles 54–56, sec. 1; articles 57–61, 
sec. 2).6 In addition, chapter 3 of the constitution speaks about how the 
federal government and Parliament share their powers when dealing 
with foreign relations (articles 184, 186).7 As we will see, the cantons 
normally deal directly with the federal government, but they can also 
use certain mechanisms to influence the federal parliament.
Competencies
The most important cantonal powers currently lie in the areas of educa-
tion, health care, police, construction, and local infrastructure, includ-
ing public transport and energy and water supply.8 In addition, the 
cantons often have the task of implementing federal policies – that is, 
in the area of labour conditions, immigration, or some aspects of envi-
ronmental policy (for an example related to environmental policy see 
Casado-Asensio and Steurer 2016). As a consequence, these are the 
areas in which more examples of friction between Switzerland’s for-
eign affairs and their activities and interests exist.
An important addendum to the constitution of 1999 is a provision 
that states explicitly for the first time that the federal level in its rela-
tions with foreign states “shall respect the powers of the cantons and 
protect their interests” (article 54, paragraph 3). Furthermore, the can-
tons are given specific procedural rights to participate in the making of 
foreign-policy decisions by the federal level (article 55).
Besides these new elements in the constitution of 1999 and some 
added details regarding existing principles, in the very same year a 
new federal law was adopted to fill these provisions with meaning, the 
Federal Law on the Participation of the Cantons in the Foreign Policy 
of the Swiss Confederation, on 22 December (BGMK 1999).9 This law 
is mostly concerned with increased participation in the negotiations 
of international agreements, and the ratification of these agreements is 
governed by the ratification provisions in the constitution (which shall 
be treated in the next section).
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Intergovernmental Relations
The BGMK was Switzerland’s first attempt to find solutions to the 
increased importance of international developments and, in particu-
lar, binding international agreements at the local level. This process is 
often associated with the phenomenon of globalization, though one can 
show that developments of a similar nature had already taken place 
in the late nineteenth century. Nevertheless, as in many other coun-
tries, the developments since the Second World War (especially in the 
1980s and 1990s) have led to a widespread and intense perception that 
local autonomy and existing powers are more and more affected by 
increased cooperation at the global and European level. The resulting 
rules and principles do limit the scope for national and sub-federal 
decision making (see Füglister and Wasserfallen 2014). As interna-
tional negotiations are traditionally the responsibility of the federal 
government, the federal parliament, citizens (direct democracy), and 
the cantons were looking for ways to influence this process, be it before, 
during, or after the negotiation of binding international rules or even of 
legally non-binding rules that could still de facto limit their impact (see 
Cina 2016).10 Consider the following:
• Article 1 of the BGMK takes up the general principle that the cantons 
must be allowed to participate in all processes (i.e., decision making) 
led by the federal government internationally whenever the processes 
affect areas in which the cantons are competent at the domestic level 
or, generally, where their essential interests are concerned. According 
to the text of the constitution, the essential interests of the cantons 
are always concerned when such international decisions lead to 
important implementation tasks at the cantonal level (paragraph 
2). Although the law states that this participation in the decision 
making should not hamper the effectiveness of Swiss foreign policy 
(paragraph 3), there are no clear indications on how this should be 
prevented or when this would be the case.
• Article 2 states the objectives of cantonal participation in the 
negotiations. The cantons will have an opportunity to defend their 
interests regarding the outcome of the negotiations as such and 
the necessary implementation that they will have to ensure. Where 
possible, they should be given the chance to prevent an erosion of 
their own powers. In addition, it is hoped that this participation 
gives domestic legitimacy to the outcome of the negotiations by the 
federal government.
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• In general, cantons and the federal government are to exchange as 
much information as possible. In particular, the federal government 
will inform the cantons early and comprehensively on the issues 
at stake in upcoming negotiations whenever they ask for it (article 
3). Before negotiations are undertaken, the federal government 
must give the cantons an opportunity to express their views in a 
consultation process. This special consultation process comes in 
addition to the existing consultation of various stakeholders that is 
traditionally undertaken for major negotiations (just as for special 
legislative projects). Whenever the position of the cantons is not 
respected, though their domestic powers are affected, the federal 
government needs to provide justification (article 4).
• The federal government can include representatives of the cantons 
in the preparation of a specific negotiation mandate as well as in the 
negotiating teams themselves. Whenever their powers are affected, 
they normally have a right to such representation. The cantons 
must decide among themselves how they want to nominate the 
respective representative(s), although the official appointment is the 
prerogative of the federal government (article 5).
• All information exchanged between the cantons and the federal 
government is to be treated as confidential (article 6).
• In the final operative provision of the law (article 7), the generally 
accepted (but so far unwritten) principle of Swiss constitutional law 
is codified for the first time, that the cantons have a legal obligation 
to implement international commitments entered into by the federal 
government.
The existence of the specific BGMK does not mean that other policy 
instruments that had already existed before the coming into force of 
this new law cannot be used by the cantons to defend their strategic 
trade interests. One such instrument is the so-called Cantonal Initiative 
(Standesinitiative) (Federal Constitution 1999, article 160, paragraph 
1).11 Under this rule a policy proposal must be treated by the federal 
parliament and can potentially lead to a binding decision for the federal 
government (for a description of the role of the federal parliament, see 
Granat 2017).12 Although this was traditionally not often the case, these 
requests can concern the foreign trade policy of the country. It seems 
that the use of such initiatives has increased in recent years. A good 
example is a recent cantonal initiative by the canton of Vaud. In April 
2016 this canton’s parliament adopted a cantonal initiative to request 
that, in the ongoing negotiations between Switzerland and Malaysia, 
market access liberalization for palm oil not be included. Although 
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several NGOs and lobbies had already submitted similar proposals, 
mostly for ecological reasons that see the production methods of palm 
oil in Malaysia as unsustainable, the request by this canton was mostly 
motivated by economic, that is, protectionist reasons. Vaud has a rela-
tively important agricultural sector and produces a fair amount of colza 
(rapeseed) oil (BauernZeitung 2016). In July 2016 a parallel initiative 
was discussed by the big chamber of the canton of Thurgau, another 
canton with an important agricultural sector. The federal government 
had always rejected a total ban or exclusion from the negotiations 
because this is an important sector for Malaysia, and the federal gov-
ernment would prefer to find rules regarding the production methods 
(to ascertain sustainability) and/or quotas to limit the negative effects 
(Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2016). This is not the first time that the importa-
tion of palm oil has been discussed in the federal parliament following 
a cantonal initiative. In 2012 a general ban, which was not limited to a 
specific negotiation of a free trade agreement with a known partner, for 
the import of palm oil was requested by the canton of Fribourg. Ulti-
mately, however, this initiative was rejected by Parliament in 2013.13
Another example of a cantonal initiative that concerns directly inter-
national trade negotiations is the one submitted by the canton of Geneva, 
which hosts the WTO among other international organizations, in early 
2015. It requested the federal government to disclose immediately the 
available information on the negotiations for a trade-in-services agree-
ment and to promise not to make any commitments leading to priva-
tizations or a reduction of public services. In addition, this cantonal 
initiative wanted the federal parliament to endorse a request to subject 
the result of the negotiations to a referendum in which both the major-
ity of the voting citizens and a majority of all cantons would have to 
vote positively. Equally, this initiative was rejected by Parliament in 
2016. In this case, it became apparent that the parliament of the canton 
of Geneva was very concerned about the legitimacy of services negotia-
tions in general and questioned not only the way this agreement was 
being negotiated but also the potential outcome. The idea that public 
services should be of a high level and that there be less room for the pri-
vate sector in the areas of health care or education is heavily influenced 
by neighbouring France and, thus, is an important political issue in this 
region of the country.
So far, the cantonal initiatives in the area of foreign trade have sel-
dom been accepted by the federal parliament, but an increase in 
their use seems apparent. Generally, the federal parliament defends 
a position that allows the federal government to participate actively 
in international and bilateral trade negotiations. This does not mean 
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that protectionist policies do not influence the Swiss position in nego-
tiations, but the federal parliament has so far been confident that the 
federal government itself knows the politically acceptable limits when 
it comes to liberalization of access to the Swiss market, particularly in 
the areas of agriculture, public services, and migration. Yet, the pos-
sibility that certain cantons will try to limit the negotiating freedom 
of the federal government in advance or during negotiations, through 
cantonal initiatives submitted to the federal parliament, should not be 
neglected in the future.
As in other federal states (for example, Belgium), the ratification pro-
cess of certain international agreements is subject to approval by can-
tons in addition to the more common approval by the two chambers of 
the federal parliament. This procedure was codified in more detail even 
before the entry of the new constitution of 1999 and before the rules on 
participation in ongoing negotiations just outlined. Although the consti-
tutions of 1848 and 1874 foresaw the approval of certain treaties by the 
federal parliament, an amendment in 1921 was voted to subject certain 
important treaties to additional approval by the citizens in a referendum 
(direct democracy) (Popular Initiative 1921, article 89, paragraph 4).14
Much later, in 1977, this provision was extended to include the 
approval by a majority of the cantons in certain rare cases. Interest-
ingly, when the first constitution was discussed in 1848, at least one 
canton requested that all treaties should be approved by a majority of 
the cantons – a proposal that was rejected.15 Similar proposals by Mem-
bers of Parliament in the nineteenth century did not receive much sup-
port. For the first time, in 1972, when Switzerland concluded its first 
bilateral trade agreement with the European Union (at that time the 
European Economic Community), the federal government decided to 
submit the agreement to a referendum, which, for the agreement to be 
accepted, required a majority of the voting citizens and a majority of the 
population of each canton to vote in favour of it. This was controversial 
because it was not explicitly foreseen in the constitution. The federal 
government argued that the ratification of such an important agree-
ment should be treated like a change of the constitution, which requires 
the application of this procedure. The idea that agreements of the same 
importance to the country as a change in the constitution should be 
accepted by a majority of the cantons was formally introduced by an 
amendment to the constitution in 1977. Since then, all treaties leading 
to membership in an international organization in the area of collective 
defence or of a supranational character have been subjected to approval 
by both the majority of all voting citizens and a majority of the cantons 
(Federal Constitution 1874, amend. 1977, article 89, paragraph 5).
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Additionally, for a wider group of treaties eight cantons can request 
that the approval of the treaty be subject to a referendum in which a 
majority of those who vote have to support it. It is extremely rare that 
eight cantons decide together to use this prerogative, and it has so far 
never happened with regard to foreign policy issues (for news cover-
age see Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2013).16 This solution in the constitution of 
1999 is still in force today (article 140, paragraph 1b).
Interestingly, as had been done in 1972 with regard to the first free 
trade agreement concluded with the European Union, the ratification 
of the comprehensive trade agreement creating a European Economic 
Area, between the European Union and members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), in 1992 was subjected to approval by both 
a majority of the voting citizens and a majority of the cantons. This 
was done despite the fact that legally the agreement did not require 
such a double majority under the constitution, because it neither led to 
membership in an international organization in the area of collective 
defence nor was it of a supranational character. In this case, the federal 
government felt that the economic and political consequences of the 
agreement were so important that they justified such a procedure. The 
debate on whether this constituted a violation of the constitution was 
intense but ultimately without consequence. As a matter of fact, this 
agreement was very comprehensive and basically would have led to 
an integration into the internal market of the European Union without 
proper membership.17
In 2012 a proposal for another amendment of the constitution was 
voted that would have extended the number of cases in which a major-
ity of the cantons would have to vote in favour of the ratification of an 
international agreement. More than 75 per cent of the voting citizens 
and all the cantons rejected this proposal. Nevertheless, discussions 
continue regarding which international treaties should be subject to 
joint approval by the majority of the voting citizens and the majority 
of the cantons.18
While it is thus rare that a majority of voters in a majority of cantons 
have to approve a specific treaty by way of a referendum, the cantons 
can always try to influence the federal parliament before it has to ratify 
the treaties. The situation in which Parliament has to approve interna-
tional treaties is much more common, in particular when it comes to 
trade agreements that are normally not subject to a referendum (though 
it is more common today for NGOs to request it). It is not always easy 
to isolate, from other interest groups, the influence of specific cantons 
on the federal parliament when it approves international treaties, but 
there are rare instances in which it was generally agreed that the view 
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of one or several cantons influenced the outcome of a vote (which was 
negative, an unusual result).
The most striking example in recent years was probably the nega-
tive vote by the federal parliament regarding an agreement with Ger-
many on air traffic originating at Zurich airport. This airport (like all 
Swiss airports) is relatively close to the border and thus leads to regular 
complaints by the German border regions that are most affected by the 
noise. It is by far Switzerland’s biggest airport and since the 1990s has 
increasingly been used as a hub, with many passengers in transit. One 
can thus consider this a case of trade in services because Swiss and for-
eign airlines create jobs and tax income in the Zurich area by servicing 
international (transiting) passengers who could otherwise use another 
airport in Europe. In 2001 a new agreement was negotiated between the 
German and Swiss governments that was considered relatively restric-
tive by the German Land of Baden-Württemberg on behalf of its local 
population. Consequently, discussion in the Swiss federal parliament 
was very heated. The bigger chamber of Parliament rejected the treaty 
on 19 June 2002, and the smaller chamber did so on 18 March 2003.19 It 
was generally held that the negative comments of the canton of Zurich 
had had a decisive influence on the Members of Parliament. Ten years 
later a new agreement was negotiated by the Swiss and German gov-
ernments. A member of the Zurich cantonal administration (from the 
unit responsible for foreign affairs and, in particular, European affairs) 
had been included in the Swiss delegation during these negotiations. 
The outcome was even less favourable from a Swiss perspective, but 
this time the canton of Zurich supported the ratification of the treaty,20 
which led to a positive vote in the Swiss parliament; the German side 
never submitted the treaty to Parliament.
As elsewhere in Europe, the debate on the effects of globalization 
on society intensified in the 1980s and early 1990s; some would even 
say that it started in the 1970s. For the cantons this discussion mostly 
focused on the need to safeguard their interests in the negotiations, 
in the conclusion of international treaties, and in the formulation of 
common policies in international organizations, mostly at the regional 
European level but also at the global level. This need was particularly 
important due to the relative openness of the Swiss economy and the 
strong need to have access to international markets in view of the small 
size of the economy and the absence of natural resources. Two impor-
tant milestones in this debate were the negotiation of a European Eco-
nomic Area with the European Union (1989–92) (see Schweizer 1992, 
59) and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round leading to the creation 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 (see Wasescha 1996). 
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These discussions and developments triggered the creation of a body 
in which the cantons discuss and coordinate their interests regarding 
Switzerland’s foreign policy: the so-called Conference of the Cantonal 
Governments (Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, KdK).
It became apparent, and is still vividly discussed today, that the 
request for better inclusion in foreign policymaking also required the 
cantons to increase both their ability to participate actively and their 
expertise in the area. This was particularly felt with regard to Euro-
pean integration because Switzerland over time was increasingly sur-
rounded by members of the European Union to and from which most 
products, migration, and capital flow. The KdK was seen as the first 
institutional improvement that could help the cantons to strengthen 
their position. It was established on 8 October 1993 as a permanent 
body under a specific treaty between all twenty-six cantonal govern-
ments.21 The KdK has a secretariat based in Berne, Switzerland’s capi-
tal. Regular meetings of a plenary assembly are foreseen, but in practice 
many specific working groups do most of the substantive work. These 
groups deal with areas of cooperation between Switzerland and the 
European Union that are particularly important for the cantons because 
they touch upon their domestic powers (such as migration, security, 
and recognition of diplomas).22
Many of the working groups deal with topics that today are included 
in modern comprehensive trade agreements, like the free movement of 
workers and professionals who provide services, or of specific services 
sectors (education, air transport), but no working group is devoted to 
trade in general that is not related to the European Union. Owing to 
the paramount importance of Europe for Swiss foreign trade policy, all 
working groups focus on the European Union. The KdK acknowledges, 
however, that at the global level Switzerland’s foreign economic policy 
(in particular when it involves the liberalization of certain services, 
migration, and investment flows, for example) affects also the cantons 
and their interests. As an example, the granting of market access to for-
eign service suppliers can lead to specific quotas for workers that need 
to be controlled at the cantonal level, as the federal authorities have 
no staff and administrative bodies to do this. The same is true when it 
comes to the recognition of diplomas or the issuance of work permits. 
The representation of the KdK’s interests at the federal level is under-
taken by the secretariat of the KdK. The members of the secretariat can 
represent the KdK in working groups or other bodies established by the 
federal government, as well as in delegations that participate in inter-
national negotiations, as foreseen in the Law on the Participation of the 
Cantons in the Foreign Policy of the Swiss Confederation. In addition 
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to European integration, the KdK is particularly interested in the nego-
tiations of the WTO and bilateral free trade agreements.23 This is due to 
the fact that, so far, the access to domestic services markets for foreign 
companies and their detached workers has been discussed mostly in 
these settings.
One additional area of foreign trade that interests the cantons par-
ticularly is public procurement. It is also increasingly common to sub-
ject the purchase of goods and services by sub-federal entities to the 
disciplines negotiated in the framework of the Government Procure-
ment Agreement of the WTO and respective chapters in free trade 
agreements. Public procurement issues are dealt with by a separate 
body created by the governments of the cantons through a convention 
in 2009, the Conference of Directors for Planning, Construction, and 
the Environment (Bau-, Planungs- und Umweltdirektoren-Konferenz, 
BPUK).24 Like the KdK, it is a public body, composed of the members of 
each cantonal government responsible for planning, construction, and 
the environment. In addition, this body has a member from the Princi-
pality of Liechtenstein and the Association of Towns and the Associa-
tion of Communes. It is not legally related to the KdK, as are several 
other such bodies created by the cantons for coordination in specific 
areas. Nonetheless, all these bodies use the infrastructure of the KdK 
and meet regularly in its offices in Berne. The BPUK, which deals not 
only with international negotiations, is in charge of public procurement 
because construction projects are particularly important when it comes 
to public procurement at the local level.
The secretariat of the KdK is managed by an independent institution, 
the Ch Foundation for Confederal Cooperation, which the cantons cre-
ated in 1967.25 Within this body one staff member (of a total of three 
working at the headquarters) is in charge of foreign affairs. Currently 
this is Roland Mayer, who has held the position for many years and 
thereby has become part of the foreign policy landscape in this small 
country. He is in charge of an additional three persons who have their 
workplace directly within federal government offices. Two members 
of staff are delegated to the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs unit in 
charge of negotiations with the European Union, the Directorate for 
European Affairs. A third person is delegated to the federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, not in Berne but in the Swiss Mission to the European 
Union in Brussels.26
At the local level, it must be remembered that obviously the bigger 
cantons simply have more resources than the others to deal with for-
eign affairs. The smallest canton of Appenzell Innerhoden with its six-
teen thousand inhabitants acts differently than the biggest, the canton 
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of Zurich, with its 1.4 million inhabitants. The latter, like many other 
large cantons, has created within its administration a special unit to deal 
with external matters, although this often includes not only relations 
with other states or international organizations but also issues pertain-
ing to other cantons or neighbouring regions.27 Some of these bodies 
are quite active when it comes to, for instance, the promotion of their 
economic interests abroad. As a recent example, we can mention the 
organization of a networking meeting between Chinese investors and 
the local authorities in Zurich.28 Even the biggest of these sub-national 
actors are too small, however, and their administrative capacities are 
too limited to shape the foreign relations of the country as a whole in a 
systematic and direct matter. Their influence is sometimes even further 
reduced by the absence of a common standpoint among the cantons 
(or absence of even totally opposite views). As the number of cantons 
is relatively high, the likelihood of finding a common denominator is 
small, and their economic situations are so diverse that they hardly ever 
fight together for a specific point. In this sense, sectoral lobbies (such as 
farmers, financial services providers, and the pharmaceutical industry) 
are more likely to succeed. They may be supported by those cantons to 
which their specific economic activity is particularly important.
A good recent example in this respect is the response by Switzer-
land to pressure within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and from the European Union to revise its 
domestic corporate tax system. The issue had led to tensions between 
Switzerland and its neighbours since the early 2000s, escalating after 
the financial crisis in 2008. As corporate tax is, to a large extent, within 
the competence of the cantons, any revision of the corporate tax sys-
tem would immediately affect their regulatory authority and have a 
direct impact on the income available to them. The negotiations in 
the OECD and with the European Union led to the threat of black-
listing Switzerland if some favourable tax treatments available to 
multinational companies (e.g., tax breaks on overseas earnings) were 
not ended. This required a total overhaul of the corporate tax system 
for all companies, leading to a discussion of the extent to which this 
would affect the attractiveness of certain cantons to multinational 
companies. Not all cantons were affected by this question in the same 
way, as some regions of the country are more attractive to multina-
tional companies than others. The federal government involved the 
cantons heavily in a reform proposal that ultimately had to be sub-
mitted to a popular vote in a referendum. In this case, all cantons 
were directly affected by the international pressure and thus had an 
interest in finding a solution. They issued a common statement on 13 
200 Ziegler
January 2017, inviting voters to adopt the proposal (in order to avoid 
being blacklisted at the international level).29
The Second Chamber
Since 1848 the Swiss constitutional system has been characterized by 
a two-chamber system, which some say was due to the liberal elite’s 
admiration of the system introduced in the United States. One cham-
ber, the Nationalrat (National Council), is made up of representatives 
of the people (with larger cantons having more representatives than 
smaller ones), and the other chamber, the Ständerat (Council of States), 
represents the cantons; that is, each canton has two representatives 
(the Council of States).30 The cantonal representatives in the Council 
of States do not have to take instructions from their respective can-
tonal governments, but they are usually considered to be taking into 
account the interests of their local voters and thereby, to a large extent, 
the interests of their canton. In some cantons liaison with the cantonal 
representatives in the federal parliament (both chambers) is officially 
undertaken by the special units, with the administration dealing with 
foreign affairs. One would think that the members of the Council of 
States would see their role as mostly defending the interests of their 
cantons. This, however, is usually not the case. In both chambers one 
can observe that the votes of the representatives are normally more 
related to the party affiliation of the cantonal delegates than to the 
cantons they represent. Some observers even think that this may be an 
additional reason to create the KdK as another, informal “state organ” 
(not foreseen in the constitution) (see Vatter 2016, 342). This seems also 
true in the area of trade, where delegates in both chambers may defend 
or take up specific, important issues that affect their canton, but here 
again the ideological view of a particular delegate normally prevails.
Functioning of the Current System
Despite the fact that the participation of the Swiss cantons was codi-
fied in more detail in 1999 than it had been previously, and the cantons 
have since created institutions to effectively use their rights, the system 
is still considered insufficient by many observers. The cantons have 
repeatedly stated that they are not happy with the current system; they 
see the need for a more in-depth reform of Swiss federalism and of the 
cooperation between themselves and the federal government when it 
comes to foreign trade policy. Again, this is mostly triggered by the very 
complex and comprehensive relations with the European Union. More 
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recently, they made public statements on 24 June 2011 and 13 December 
2013 that they would only support the federal government in its future 
negotiations with the European Union if domestic reforms regarding 
the federal structure and democratic participation were launched.31 
The cantons want to achieve an even more far-reaching participation in 
the foreign policy of Switzerland, and they have made several concrete 
proposals for reform:
1. The cantons want to be informed early – not only when their pow-
ers are concerned but also, generally, when their interests (even 
potentially in the future) are concerned.
2. The cantons want to have at least three months before present-
ing their own position. Only this would allow them to consult 
stakeholders meaningfully. A shorter period seems to them to be 
unrealistic and threatens their right to participate actively in the 
decision-making process.
3. When it comes to questions regarding European integration,  often 
on the subject of trade, the cantons want to enhance the weight 
of their own position. The government should only be allowed to 
defend another position if preponderant foreign-policy interests 
can be invoked.
4. The existing informal dialogue between the federal government 
and the cantons is considered to be insufficient. The cantons would 
like to see the creation of a standing body for the sole purpose of 
discussing foreign affairs with the federal government and the 
cantons. This body should be used for all areas of foreign policy-
making, though the complexity and abundance of decisions related 
to the European Union are again at the origin of this proposal.
5. So far, there is a foreign-policy dialogue between the federal 
government and the cantons. The cantons, however, see that the 
federal government is also influenced by Parliament, and thus 
they would like to participate in the meetings and discussions of 
the specialized parliamentary committees, through either writ-
ten submission or active participation in the meetings. Already at 
this stage it is not uncommon for the parliamentary committees to 
invite representatives of the cantons to hearings.
On several occasions the representatives of the cantons have voiced 
their concern regarding the current system and the importance of 
adopting the suggested reforms. Most recently, the president of the 
KdK has even threatened to sue the federal government before the 
Supreme Federal Court, exercising a type of constitutional jurisdiction 
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in this context. The KdK is of the opinion that the federal system as a 
whole is in need of reform to take into account the increasing complex-
ity of decision making at the federal level, which often affects, directly 
or indirectly, the cantons. Foreign affairs and trade play an important 
role in this, but the phenomenon is more widespread.
Conclusions
The discussion on how the relationship (and the institutional balance) 
between the cantons and the federal level in Switzerland is affected by 
increasingly intense and far-reaching foreign affairs has been signifi-
cant in the country over the last thirty years. The most important part of 
Swiss foreign policy has always been trade and economic integration. 
This has been exacerbated by the creation of the European Union, where 
purely economic and other aspects of cooperation and integration often 
converge. Switzerland is one of the few remaining European states that 
is not a member of the Union, and as a rather small, export-oriented 
state, it depends on its European markets. As a result, its foreign policy 
is heavily dominated by its bilateral relations with the European Union. 
The perceived change in the federal structure in Switzerland is, there-
fore, often discussed because of European integration.
But this does not mean that other areas of trade with partner coun-
tries that are farther afield or within global organizations like the WTO 
or the OECD could not affect the powers and autonomy of the can-
tons. One example that has been shown is the liberalization of mar-
ket access for agricultural goods, where rural cantons naturally have 
strong interests in protecting the local agricultural sector from foreign 
market competition. Another example is the liberalization of trade in 
services, where existing monopolies and prerogatives in areas such as 
health, education, and public utilities lead to important challenges for 
the existing structures and traditions of the cantons. This is also true in 
the area of public procurement, where changes introduced at the global 
level (in the Government Procurement Agreement of the WTO) and at 
the European level have totally altered the procurement practices of the 
cantons in the last twenty years. Finally, the increasing demand to allow 
migration as a part of trade negotiations (supply of services through 
seasonal workers, access to the labour market, etc.) leads to additional 
concerns that influence the traditional fields of cantonal politics.
Amendments to the constitution and the adoption of the Federal 
Law on the Participation of the Swiss Cantons in the Foreign Policy of 
the Federal State in 1999 tried to accommodate the increased need to 
involve the cantons in foreign policy and the conclusion of international 
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treaties. The cantons have also discovered the use of cantonal initiatives 
to influence the federal parliament in areas where they fear that the fed-
eral government is not sufficiently taking their problems into account.
The cantons have had to adapt their institutions in order to use these 
instruments. At the internal level, many of them have increased the 
resources dedicated to foreign affairs, in particular European integra-
tion). At least the bigger cantons now normally have specialized agen-
cies in the administration that not only promote the canton to foreign 
investors but also follow developments in foreign policy, in particular 
economic aspects that might be of relevance to the canton and its direct 
interaction with other cantons and the federal government and parlia-
ment. Together the cantons have created bodies (in particular the KdK) 
and arrived at a common position towards the federal government – or 
simply coordinated their policies and views. The fact that the federal 
government even accepts permanent representatives of this body in its 
own ministries and missions abroad (in addition to the ad hoc nomi-
nation of members of international delegations) is remarkable. At the 
same time, one should not overestimate the potential of the cantons 
in the area of foreign policy and, particularly, trade. Even the bigger 
cantons that can employ trade specialists may face the problem that it 
is not easy to convince local politicians and members of cantonal parlia-
ments and governments with regard to the sometimes rather dry ques-
tions of international trade. Expertise in the area of trade is not evenly 
spread among all the Swiss cantons and their representatives at both 
cantonal and federal levels.
In addition, important differences between the cantons can make it 
difficult to come up with common positions. In recent years the divide 
between urbanized regions and rural areas has seemed apparent, albeit 
mitigated by the continuous urbanization of most of the country. Here, 
as in other areas of Swiss federalism, it has been voiced that the urban 
centres should have their own role to play in the political system, but 
concrete measures have not been taken so far. In these cases, the bigger 
(and richer) cantons may find it easier to defend their own positions 
directly at the federal level, something that is difficult for the smaller 
cantons to do.
Overall, it can be said that increased sub-federal involvement has 
resulted in better acceptance of the negotiation results by the cantons 
and therefore by the population in general, but at the price of slower 
and more complicated communication procedures that affect the flex-
ibility of the federal government. The cantons have already asked for 
increased participation and even threatened to sue the government if a 
total reform of the federal system is not achieved soon (not only with 
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regard to trade or foreign affairs in general). The increased use of can-
tonal initiatives, as well as the more common idea of using cantonal 
referendums against federal government decisions, in the area of trade 
and foreign affairs underlines this trend.
NOTES
 1 Most famously, such an agreement between Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden of early August 1291 – the Rütlischwur, one of many military 
alliances, i.e., Bundesbriefe (in German) or Pactes fédéraux (in French) – 
is traditionally used as a historic origin for the country and justifies the 
celebration of a national holiday on 1 August. The decision to refer to 
this particular document as a historic starting point is, however, rather 
controversial and mostly the result of the nation-building process in the 
second part of the nineteenth century.
 2 The Federal Constitution of 18 April 1999 was entered into force on 1 
January 2000.
 3 For a historic case study in English see Behr (2014).
 4 For an interesting study of why tensions between the language regions 
are less of a problem in Switzerland than in Belgium, see Wouters, Van 
Kerckhoven, and Vidal (2016).
 5  For an account under the old constitution and before the entry into force 
of the Federal Law on the Participation of the Cantons in the Foreign 
Policy of the Swiss Confederation of 1999, see Schmitt (1994). 
 6 Section 1, articles 54–6, of the constitution of 1999; security, national 
defence, and civil defence are treated in section 2 of the same chapter 
(articles 57–61).
 7 Articles 184 and 186 of the constitution of 1999.
 8 Those relating to trade (including trade in services and public 
procurement) and trade-related migration are addressed in this chapter, 
and for other areas the following studies may be interesting: health, Trein 
(2017); education, Behrens (2016). 
 9 Bundesgesetzüber die Mitwirkung der Kantone an der Aussenpolitik des 
Bundes (BGMK) of 22 December 1999, AS 2000 1477, https://www.admin.ch.
 10 See for an example a recent interview given by the president of the 
Conference of Cantons (Konferenz der Kantonsregierungen, KdK) in 
which he complains about the erosion of cantonal powers and political 
autonomy due (inter alia) to international agreements, in Cina (2016).
 11 Article 160, paragraph 1, of the constitution.
 12 For a description of the role of the federal parliament in the federal system 
see Granat (2017).
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 13 See the official record, https://www.parlament.ch/de/ratsbetrieb/
suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20120313.
 14 Article 89, paragraph 4, of the Swiss constitution of 1974, introduced by 
referendum (Popular Initiative) in 1921. 
 15 See the detailed description of the historic development by the 
government in the official journal (Botschaft des Bundesrates 
an die Bundesversammlung über die Neuordnung des 
Staatsvertragsreferendums vom 23. November 1974, BBl 1974 II 1133–6).  
 16 In a recent debate about the ratification of an agreement between 
Switzerland and Germany and regarding the use of German airspace in 
connection with flights from and to Zurich airport, the employment of this 
instrument was discussed but rejected by the responsible parliamentary 
committee of the canton of Zurich. See the coverage in Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 29 August 2013, https://www.nzz.ch.
 17 As a consequence, Switzerland did not join the European Economic 
Area, and the other EFTA members all became parties to the EEA. Today 
Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein are the remaining EFTA members in 
the EEA, and the others have since joined the European Union.
 18 For a discussion of this proposal by the Conference of Cantons (KdK) 
see http://www.kdk.ch/de/themen/allgemeine-aussenpolitik/
staatsvertragsreferendum/.
 19 For an official summary of the negotiations see the government statement 
of 10 September 2003 at https://www.parlament.ch.
 20 See the interview with the responsible member of the government of the 
canton of Zurich, Ernst Stocker, in Tagesanzeiger, 6 July 2012, http://www.
tagesanzeiger.ch; and the official press release of the canton, https://vd.zh.
ch. Some parties were not so happy and suggested that the canton reject 
the proposed text and even launch a procedure to request a referendum at 
the national level.
 21 The text of the Convention on the Conference of Cantonal Governments is 
available in English at http://www.kdk.ch.
 22 The list of working groups is available online at http://www.kdk.ch.
 23 See the respective statement on the home page of the KdK: http://www.
kdk.ch.
 24 For detailed information on this body see its home page, http://www.
bpuk.ch. The current statute dates from 20 September 2012 and has 
replaced the original of 18 September 2009. It is available online on the site 
of the organization.
 25 For details on this body, a foundation under Swiss private law, with its 
seat in Solothurn see http://www.chstiftung.ch.
 26 For details see http://www.kdk.ch/de/die-kdk/sekretariat/.
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 27 See, for the canton of Zurich, https://aussenbeziehungen.zh.ch; and for 
the canton of St Gallen, http://www.aussenbeziehungen.sg.ch.
 28 See the press release “Volkswirtschaftsdirektion vernetzt chinesische 
Unternehmer im Kanton Zürich,” at https://aussenbeziehungen.zh.ch.
 29 See KdK press release of 13 January 2017, “Les Cantons disent OUI à la 
réforme de l’imposition des entreprises” (The Cantons say “yes” to the 
corporate tax reform), https://kdk.ch.
 30 The Ständerat (Council of States) is the second chamber, representing the 
twenty-six cantons (similar to the US Senate). It comprises forty-six elected 
Ständeräte (councillors): two represent each of the twenty “full” cantons, 
and one represents each of the six so-called half cantons.
 31 See the two press releases at https://kdk.ch/de/aktuell/
medienmitteilungen/.
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